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Abstract: Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was modeled after the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, drafted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) in 1997.  Despite the relatively small 
number of cases commenced in U.S. Courts under Chapter 15 since its adoption, 
no other section of the current Bankruptcy Code has broader implications for 
international business transactions and global foreign business relations than 
the provisions of Chapter 15.  Moreover, since the United States has long been 
an innovator at the forefront of international insolvency law, interpretation of 
key provisions of the Chapter and related UNCITRAL Model Law complements 
by U.S. courts could provide meaningful guidance for foreign policymakers and 
courts as well as foreign and domestic businesses operating globally.  This 
Comment provides a brief history of international insolvency law, focusing on 
the development of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the eventual adoption of 
Chapter 15 into U.S. Bankruptcy Code and its impacts on substantive U.S. law.  
It then examines two major emerging legal issues facing U.S courts since 
Chapter 15’s adoption, namely, the development of the “Center of Main 
Interests” analysis and the “Public Policy Exception,” and analyzes these issues 
within the framework of the stated goals of the Chapter as defined in the Code 
and based on the Model Law. 
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The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA or the Act), signed into law by President George W. Bush on 
April 20, 2005, represented the “largest overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code 
since its enactment in 1978.”1  BAPCPA’s overall purpose was to “improve 
bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and 
integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both 
debtors and creditors.”2  While the majority of the Act focused on personal 
consumer bankruptcy actions, parts of the Act had significant effects on 
commercial bankruptcies.  Specifically, the new Chapter 15 addressed the 
filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding and replaced the 
repealed Bankruptcy Code Section 304 (Section 304).
3
  Despite the 
sweeping changes indicated by BAPCPA overall, commentators noted prior 
to its adoption that enactment would not likely make substantial changes to 
the treatment of cross-border insolvencies in U.S. courts.
4
 
Chapter 15 was modeled after and incorporated the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, drafted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) in 1997 and officially adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in January 1998.
5
  Since Chapter 15’s 
                                                        
1 BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005:  LAW AND 
EXPLANATION 3 (Sheila M. Williams et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Williams, BANKRUPTCY 
ABUSE PREVENTION]. 
2 H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
3 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. §1501 
(2006); ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: A SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 29 (2005).  Section 
304, enacted in 1978, also related to bankruptcy cases which were ancillary to foreign 
proceedings, however, Chapter 15 expanded upon and made significant departures from the 
previous procedures of the Bankruptcy Code, see discussion infra Section I.B. 
4 U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 361 
(1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reporttitlepg.html. 
5 G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
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effective date of October 17, 2005, only about 300 cases have been 
commenced in the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts under the chapter, a negligible 
proportion of the more than 4.35 million bankruptcy cases commenced 
under all chapters of the Code during that time.
6
  A total of 140 Chapter 15 
cases were filed in 2009, up from 48 in 2008.
7
  Of these, the most active 
Chapter 15 courts were the Southern District of New York  (thirty-six cases 
filed) and the District of Delaware (twenty-five cases filed).
8
 
Despite the small number of cases filed under Chapter 15, no other 
section of the current Bankruptcy Code has broader implications for 
international business transactions and global foreign business relations 
than the provisions of Chapter 15.  Moreover, since the United States has 
long been an innovator at the forefront of international insolvency law, 
particularly since its 1978 adoption of Chapter 15 predecessor Section 304 
of the Code,
9
 interpretation of key provisions of the Chapter and related 
UNCITRAL Model Law complements by U.S. courts could provide 
meaningful guidance for foreign policymakers and courts as well as foreign 
and domestic businesses operating globally. 
This Comment will examine some of the key emerging legal issues in 
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts surrounding cross-border insolvency proceedings 
since the adoption of Chapter 15, and it will analyze those issues within the 
framework of the stated goals of the Chapter as defined in the Code and 
based on the Model Law.  Part I will provide a brief history of international 
insolvency law, focusing on the development of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the eventual adoption of Chapter 15, and highlight substantive 
                                                                                                                                
Trade Law, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/442 (1997) available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html (hereinafter UNCITRAL); Williams, 
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 155. 
6 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at tbls. F-2 (2006)–(2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx.  Note that more than 300 potential 
cases may have been filed for recognition under Chapter 15 but some have been rejected for 
recognition.  Total bankruptcy filings up to Sept. 2009 were: 1,402,816 in 2009; 1,042,993 in 
2008; 801,269 in 2007; and 1,112,542 in 2006.  Id. 
7 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 24 (2009), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS.] 
(figures cited in 2009 are for the period ending Sept. 30, 2009.  There were forty-nine 
Chapter 15 cases filed in 2007 and sixty-nine filed in 2006, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 
tbls. F-2 (2006)–(2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness. 
aspx).  The reason for the significant increase in filings in 2009 is not entirely clear, although 
the worldwide financial crisis of late 2008 may have contributed to the jump in filings during 
2009. 
8 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 7. 
9 See U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 354 (highlighting U.S. 
leadership in the field of international insolvencies and restructuring and encouraging the 
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency). 
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legal changes to the Bankruptcy Code brought about by the Chapter’s 
adoption.  Part II will examine two major emerging legal issues facing U.S 
courts since the Chapter’s adoption, namely, the development of the 
“Center of Main Interests” analysis and the “Public Policy Exception,” 
analyze the potential direction of law going forward, and offer suggestions 
for adaptations and change.  Finally, Part III will offer some broader 
recommendations and concluding thoughts surrounding cross-border 
insolvencies pursuant to Chapter 15. 
I.   INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES, THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW, AND CHAPTER 15 
The significant differences in insolvency regulation and procedure 
among nations and increased globalization of business activities over the 
last several decades led to a need for a clearer understanding of applicable 
law between countries and some level of parity of the legal parameters of 
cross-border insolvency.  This Part details the development and eventual 
adoption by the United States and other nations of the most widely accepted 
international insolvency guidelines developed through the United Nations’ 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies, the changes to U.S. bankruptcy 
law through the adoption of the Model Law into Chapter 15, and the main 
goals and purposes of the revised Code as it pertains to international 
insolvencies. 
A.   Development and Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvencies 
In response to the rapid expansion of global economic activities in the 
latter part of the 20th Century, a number of international and regional 
organizations undertook the task of harmonizing the bankruptcy process 
across national borders but encountered significant difficulties in creating 
unified solutions and gaining wide acceptance of standards.
10
  Despite these 
difficulties, in 1992 the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) began to work in earnest to create such a model.
11
  
                                                        
10 U.N. Secretariat, Possible Future Work: Cross-Border Insolvency: Note by the 
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/378/Add.4 (June 23, 1993), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/865/52/IMG/V9386552.pdf?OpenElement (detailing 
various regional initiatives to harmonize insolvency law in areas including Latin America 
and Europe, and through groups like the International Bar Association, but noting a 
significant lack of harmony between the initiatives overall); see also Insolvency 
Restructuring and Creditors’ Rights Library, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet. 
org/LPD/SIRC/Inslvncy_Rstrcrng_Crdtrs_Rights/SIRC_Library.aspx (last visited June 13, 
2012) (general documents on international insolvency efforts). 
11 Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—A Legislative 
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 307–08 (2004). 
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From 1993 to 1995, UNCITRAL, along with INSOL International,
12
 held a 
number of judicial conferences and other joint international meetings, as 
well as conducted a number of studies, to assess the feasibility and process 
for creating a workable, unified cross-border insolvency model.
13
  These 
efforts noted a number of barriers to the development of a unified model 
process, including the inadequacy of current local insolvency laws, 
unpredictability of implementation of laws, and the potential costs and 
delays of cross-border insolvency proceedings.
14
 
Given these concerns, the UNCITRAL Congress agreed to address a 
number of key cross-border insolvency issues it felt were manageable and 
had potential for resolution.  These included focusing on cooperation 
among the courts of the States where debtors’ assets are located, allowing 
foreign representatives to have access to local court proceedings and 
creditors, and encouraging comity of certain orders of foreign courts in 
insolvency matters.
15
  A working group of States, inter-governmental 
organizations, and nongovernmental groups including the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, the European Insolvency 
Practitioners Association, the International Bar Association, and the 
International Chamber of Commerce worked to create the Model Law in 
Cross-Border Insolvency,
16 
adopted by UNCITRAL in May 1997.
17
 
Though the United States did not formally adopt the UNCITRAL 
Model Law until a number of years later, the U.S. National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission (NBRC) recommended the Model Law for adoption 
under the Bankruptcy Code as early as October 1997.
18
  In its report to 
President Clinton, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Congress, the NBRC noted 
that UNCITRAL’s work represented a “groundbreaking development of an 
international model law on insolvency and reorganization” and 
recommended changes to the Bankruptcy Code in order to conform to the 
                                                        
12 Insol International, INT’L ASS’N OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY, & BANKR. PROF’LS, 
http://www.insol.org/ (last visited June 13, 2012). 
13 Clift, supra note 11, at 309. 
14 Id. at 309–10; U.N. Secretariat, Cross-Border Insolvency: Report on UNCITRAL—
INSOL Colloquium on Cross-Border Insolvency, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade Law, 4 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/398 (May 19, 1994). 
15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the 
Work of its Twentieth Session, Oct. 7–18, 1996, 3 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/433 (Oct. 7, 1996). 
16 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on 
the Work of its Twenty-First Session, Jan. 20–31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/435 (Jan. 20, 
1997) (detailing the numerous organizations of the working group). 
17 G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/52/17(1997); 
Look Chan Ho, Overview, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 7 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
18 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission is an independent commission 
established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 
4106. 
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The 1997 NRBC Report noted that “although . . . changes will be 
beneficial, the principal benefit to the United States from adopting the 
Model Law will lie in the effect of its adoption on other jurisdictions” since 
“[e]arly adoption by the United States is likely to influence other countries 
to adopt [the] law and to spur international organizations to encourage 
countries to do so.”20  However, the delay of U.S. adoption of the code until 
2005 did not seem to deter other nations from recognizing the importance 
and usefulness of the Model Law in their own insolvency provisions.
21
  
Between the time of the NRBC’s initial report and the official adoption of 
the U.S. BAPCPA reforms including Chapter 15, a number of countries 
enacted all or parts of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  Eritrea, Mexico, South 
Africa, Japan, Montenegro, Northern Ireland and the British Virgin Islands, 
Poland, Romania, and Serbia all adopted the Model Law before 2005.
22
 
B.   U.S. Adoption of Chapter 15 and Changes to the Bankruptcy Code 
In its 1997 Report, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
stated that “because the United States is already a world leader” in the field 
of international insolvency law, “adoption of the [UNCITRAL] Model Law 
will result in relatively minor substantive changes to U.S. Bankruptcy 
                                                        
19 U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 353. 
20 Id. at 361. 
21 Note that adoption does not necessarily mean a nation will use the Model Law in full 
or even in partial force.  Currently, South Africa’s version of the Model Law only applies to 
official, designated countries, of which there are currently none, leaving that nation’s Act to 
implement the law practically inapplicable.  Ian R. De Witt, Presentation at the 16th 
Commonwealth Law Conference in Hong Kong:  Challenges of Cross-Border Insolvencies:  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Hong Kong and the 
Commonwealth (Apr. 2009), summary available at http://www.tannerdewitt.com/media/ 
publications/challenges-of-cross-border-insolvencies.php.  In addition, Argentina, Mexico 
and Romania all require reciprocity before the Model Law provisions are applied to a foreign 
proceeding.  Scott C. Mund, 11 U.S.C. 1506:  U.S. Courts Keep a Tight Rein on the Public 
Policy Exception, but the Potential to Undermine International Cooperation in Insolvency 
Proceedings Remains, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 336 (2010). 
22 As of February 2010, Eritrea (1998), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Japan 
(2000), Montenegro (2002), Northern Ireland and the British Virgin Islands (2003), Poland 
(2003), Romania (2003), Serbia (2004) had all adopted the Model Law.  Omer Shahid, Note, 
The Public Policy Exception:  Has § 1506 Been a Significant Obstacle in Aiding Foreign 
Bankruptcy Proceedings?, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 175, 178 (2010).  Canada also began drafting 
provisions to their Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) modeled somewhat after 
the UNCITRAL Model Law in the early 2000’s.  The revised CCAA provisions came into 
force on September 18, 2009, including official adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, §§ 267–84 and the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, §§ 44–61 (Can.); 
see generally Steven Golick & Marc Wasserman, Canada, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 59, 59–85 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 
2009) (discussing the Canadian adoption process of Model Law provisions). 
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Law.”23  While perhaps true in the abstract, adoption of the Model Law did 
in fact create significant codified changes to the process and procedure of 
international insolvencies in the context of the U.S. Bankruptcy system, 
and, as explored below in this Comment, may have served to create 




In general, Chapter 15 maintained the spirit of its predecessor Section 
304 (Cases Ancillary to Foreign Proceedings).
25
  Both favor 
“universalism”—a centralized administration of a debtor’s assets in one 
primary proceeding, with proceedings in other courts being ancillary—
rather than a territorialist approach in which multiple courts seek to assert 
jurisdiction and claims for assets among creditors.
26
  Chapter 15 and 
Section 304 also both aimed to maintain the majority of foreign insolvency 
proceedings as U.S. ancillary proceedings.
27
  Taken together, these 
preferences suggest that courts, when given discretion, will often favor a 
foreign debtor’s “home country” as the location for the main bankruptcy 
action, with any U.S. proceedings being ancillary to the foreign 
proceeding.
28
  Another significant change is that Chapter 15 is more 
prescriptive in its desire to establish interstate cooperation, dictating that the 
U.S. courts cooperate with a foreign court or representative “to the 
maximum extent possible.”29 
As a departure from Section 304, however, Chapter 15 expanded the 
cross-border insolvency purview to include laws that apply not only to 
                                                        
23 U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 361. 
24 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005).  Though not any 
sort of scientific measure, it is worth noting that 11 U.S.C. 304 contained about 250 words in 
total, while Chapter 15 contains thirty-two sections and over 4,500 words in its text.  Even 
without delving into the details of the new Chapter, it is likely that impactful changes will 
arise from the adoption of a much more standardized and “strict” process of cross-border 
insolvencies in the United States. 
25 11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005). 
26 Brendan Mockler, Chapter 15 Choice of Avoidance Law in U.S. Bankruptcy Court: Is 
it Really a Choice?, 2009 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. PT. I § 11 (2009). 
27 Id. 
28 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), Pt. 1 § 1504 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88 
(highlighting that the preference for ancillary status is still in force.  “The title ‘ancillary’ in 
the title of this section and in the title of this chapter emphasizes the United States policy in 
favor of a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor, where a main 
proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the 
main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies (often called ‘secondary’ 
proceedings) in each state where assets are found.  Under the Model Law, notwithstanding 
the recognition of a foreign main proceeding, full bankruptcy cases are permitted in each 
country (see sections 1528 and 1529).”). 
29 11 U.S.C. § 1525(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1527.  Accord In re Artimm, S.r.L., 335 
B.R. 149, 159 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (aligning with the directive of Chapter 15 to 
cooperate with foreign courts and detailing the actual and potential consequences of such 
cooperation). 
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those U.S. cases deemed ancillary to foreign proceedings but also to other 
sorts of cross-border cases.  These included cases started in the United 
States which could impact non-U.S. creditors or involve non-U.S. assets as 
well as cases pending concurrently in U.S. and non-U.S. courts.
30
 
While this change expanded the types of cases the courts might 
recognize and hear in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, perhaps a more 
significant change brought on by Chapter 15 served to effectively remove 
considerable discretionary power from U.S. courts.  Under § 304, 
cooperation with foreign jurisdictions in the context of U.S. ancillary 
bankruptcy proceedings was wholly discretionary.
31
  However, pursuant to 
Chapter 15, cooperation with the foreign country and preference for its 
proceeding to progress as a “foreign main” proceeding is mandated if the 
foreign proceeding is recognized as being filed in the debtor’s “home 
country,” triggering other provisions of the Code.32  This change, which 
aligns with the Model Law, increases the United States’ default preference 
favoring universalism.
33
  However, as discussed below, defining the 
debtor’s “home” through the provisions of determining if the case is a 




Section 1501(c) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code identifies the entities 
that are excluded from the section by referencing section 109 of the Code 
(‘Who may be a debtor’).35  It also sets a framework in which corporations 
and other business entities may obtain relief in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts.
36
  
This section was created to closely mirror Section 304.  Under Chapter 15, 
while foreign insurance companies can commence or join a proceeding, 
                                                        
30 Selina A. Melnik, United States, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 265, 272 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 2009); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1501(b) (highlighting that the chapter applies to cases where assistance is sought either by 
the United States or by a foreign court or representative in connection with a bankruptcy 
proceeding in the alternate forum, where domestic and foreign bankruptcy cases are pending 
concurrently, or where foreign entities, including creditors, have an interest in beginning or 
participating in a domestic proceeding). 
31 Hon. Allan L. Gropper, Current Developments in International Insolvency Law: A 
United States Perspective, PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 
PLI Order No. 14441, 906 PLI/Comm 685, 702 (2008). 
32 See Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (2009) 
(examining the mandatory requirement of cooperation under Chapter 15.  Note that 
“cooperation remains discretionary if the foreign proceeding is not in the debtor’s [Center of 
Main Interests], but rather in a jurisdiction where the debtor has an “establishment”—
defined as a place where the debtor carries on nontransitory economic activity.”). 
33 See discussion of determining one’s “home country” through the COMI analysis, infra 
p. 402; see also John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy 
Code: A Lesson from Maritime Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 253–54 (2007) 
(criticizing the reliance on universalism in the Chapter 15 context). 
34 For discussion of the foreign main/foreign nonmain distinction, see infra Part II.A.1. 
35 11 U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2006). 
36 Id. 
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foreign banks, foreign railroads, domestic insurance companies, and 
domestic banks are not permitted to pursue action.
37
  Moreover, the 
individual filing requirements under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(c)(2) suggest that 
very few individual consumers will be able to pursue relief under the 
chapter, as it does not apply to individual debtors who are citizens or 
permanent resident aliens of the United States and creates other restrictions 
that limit the number of non-citizen and non-resident individuals who 
would likely qualify under the chapter.
38
  This varies from the Model Law, 




Last, because it created certain mandatory court actions, Chapter 15 
also contains a public policy exception which can limit otherwise 
mandatory actions, including the recognition or primacy of foreign 
proceedings.  The language of Chapter 15 states that “[n]othing in [Chapter 
15] prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this 
chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
United States.”40 
C. Purposes & Goals of Chapter 15 and Recent Foreign Model Law 
Adoption 
In addition to creating the changes and exclusions described above, the 
                                                        
37 Id.  Note that foreign insurance companies can qualify as a “debtor” under Chapter 15. 
Id. 
38 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(c)(2) (dictating that individuals or a marital couple are not 
eligible to proceed under Chapter 15 if their debts are within the limits specified in section 
109(e) of the Code and who are “citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States.”  Effective April 1, 2010, “an individual with 
regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, 
unsecured debts of less than $360,475 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less 
than $1,081,400, or an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse, except a 
stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition, 
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $360,475 and 
noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $1,081,400” are eligible to file under 
Chapter 13 of the Code and therefore ineligible to proceed under Chapter 15.  11 U.S.C. § 
109(e).  In 2009, the average Chapter 7 bankruptcy individual filer with complete schedules 
of assets and liabilities (943,995 total) had $112,561 more in liabilities than in assets, and the 
average Chapter 13 filer with complete schedules (356,807 total) had $51,725 more in 
liabilities than in assets.  ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2009 REPORT OF STATISTICS 
REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
2005, at Tables 1A & 1D (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics.aspx.  This suggests that most individual petitioners would not be 
eligible to pursue a bankruptcy case under Chapter 15.  For the twelve-month period ending 
Sept. 30, 2009, approximately 1.34 million of the total 1.4 million bankruptcy petitions filed 
were individual filings.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 291 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx). 
39 Williams, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 157. 
40 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006). 
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first section of Chapter 15 also outlined the primary purposes of the 
Chapter.  These purposes closely mirror the goals and purposes of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law itself, and the section is quite unique when 
compared to other chapters of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which do not 
include any statement of purpose or goals.
41
  The goals are outlined as 
follows: 
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for 
dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with the objectives 
of— 
(1) cooperation between— 
(A) courts of the United States, United States trustees, 
trustees, examiners, debtors, and debtors in possession; 
and 
(B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign 
countries involved in cross-border insolvency cases; 
(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment; 
(3) fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies 
that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested 
entities, including the debtor; 
(4) protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s 
assets; and 
(5) facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, 
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.
42
 
Additionally, § 1508 dictates that “in interpreting this chapter, the 
court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an 
application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar 
statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”43  Finally, any determination for 
assistance under Chapter 15 must be “consistent with the principles of 
comity.”44  This requirement aligns with the primary considerations under 
                                                        
41 This is not to say, however, that other sections of the Code do not have specific 
purposes or goals within them (protecting the interests of creditors, ensuring the speedy 
resolution of proceedings, etc.), but rather that the goals of Chapter 15 are clearly set forth 
and designed as a lead in to the entire Chapter.  11 U.S.C. § 1501. 
42 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). 
43 11 U.S.C. § 1508. 
44 11 U.S.C. § 1507; see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (defining comity 
generally as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
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the repealed Section 304.
45
 
After U.S. adoption in 2005, nine nations have adopted all or 
significant parts of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency.  Most notably, Great Britain adopted the Model Law in 2006 
and Australia followed suit in 2008.
46
  In addition, while the Cayman 
Islands has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law per se, the nation’s 
“Grand Court applies Model Law principals in all but name.”47 
II.  KEY EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 
Scholars examining Chapter 15 and its predecessor Section 304 have 
sometimes focused on the broader debate of the values of universalism 
contained in the Bankruptcy Code and the values of a more territorial 
approach to international insolvencies.
48
  However, two significant lines of 
legal inquiry have emerged that highlight the narrower, practical issues 
facing U.S. courts in the cross-border bankruptcy context: the Center of 
Main Interest (COMI) Analysis and the Public Policy Exception.  Here, this 
Comment will explore these issues by considering the language of Code, 
examining domestic and foreign case law, and analyzing potential for 
revision and change. 
                                                                                                                                
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws”); U.S. v. J.A. Jones Const. Group, LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (discussing the primacy and importance of comity as a concept to adhere to in the 
context of Chapter 15 proceedings). 
45 See In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 291 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “all relief under 
section 304 was discretionary and based on subjective, comity-influenced factors”); see also 
H.R.REP. NO. 95-595, at 324–25, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280–81; S.REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821 (legislative history of § 304 
stating that “these guidelines are designed to give the court the maximum flexibility in 
handling ancillary cases.  Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments 
and laws of other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders 
under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible 
rules.”). 
46 Shahid, supra note 22, at 178; See also, Status, 1997—Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/ 
1997Model_status.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (showing that the nations which have 
adopted the Model Law are Great Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), Columbia (2006), 
South Korea (2006), Slovenia (2007), Australia (2008), Mauritius (2009), Canada (2009), 
and Greece (2010)). 
47 Tony Heaver-Wren & Jeremy Walton, Cayman Islands, in CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 87 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d 
ed. 2009) (noting that major amendments to the Cayman Islands’ Companies Law through 
the Companies (Amendment) Law 2007 “codifies the Grand Court’s powers to make orders 
in aid of foreign insolvency proceedings.”  Id. at 88). 
48 See, e.g., Chung, supra note 33, at 253–54 (criticizing the reliance on universalism in 
the Chapter 15 context); Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border 
Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43 (2008) 
(comparing the values of universalism and territorialism in cross-border insolvencies). 
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A. The Center of Main Interests (COMI) Analysis 
1. Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding and COMI in the Language 
of Chapter 15 
One of the most significant changes to the United States Courts’ 
treatment of international insolvencies is that which changed the discretion 
of the Court and practically mandated foreign cooperation in some cases. 
If a foreign entity can be classified as a “debtor” by overcoming the 
hurdles of Section 1501(c),
49
 it might logically follow that they would be 
able to qualify for relief under Chapter 15.  As one commentator notes, 
“from the plain language of Chapter 15, it appears that a foreign corporation 
that is not a railroad or a banking institution, and that has residence, 
domicile, place of business, or property in the United States can obtain 
relief under Chapter 15.”50  However, as discussed below, the process of 
obtaining relief has proven much more cumbersome in some cases. 
A Chapter 15 case is commenced by filing a petition for recognition of 
a foreign proceeding pursuant to Section 1515 by a foreign representative.
51
  
Recognition under Chapter 15 is crucial: if a court refuses to recognize a 
proceeding, foreign proceedings or debtors may be jurisdictionally estopped 
from seeking relief or cooperation from U.S. state or federal courts.
52
 
In order to gain recognition under Chapter 15, a non-U.S. proceeding 
must be designated as a “foreign proceeding.”  Under the Code, a foreign 
proceeding is: 
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign 
country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to 
insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and 
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign 
                                                        
49 See discussion supra Section I.B. of “who may be a debtor.” 
50 Judith Elkin et al., Sauce for the Goose?  Dual Standard Emerging in Cross Border 
Insolvencies: Domicile Not Enough to Recognize Foreign Proceeding, Bankruptcy & 
Reorganizations: Current Developments 2010, PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 22594, 927 PLI/Comm 947, 952 (2010). 
51 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (defining a “foreign representative” 
as a person or body, including an interim representative, “authorized in a foreign proceeding 
to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as 
a representative of such foreign proceeding”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1515 (dictating that a 
foreign representative must file a petition for recognition including English language 
translations of any court decisions certifying a foreign proceeding, a certificate from the 
foreign court affirming the existence of foreign proceedings and/or the appointment of a 
foreign representative, etc.). 
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 1509(d).  Note that Chapter 15 recognition is affirmatively not a 
prerequisite for U.S. court cooperation in the case where the foreign representative is seeking 
assistance from the U.S. solely to “collect or recover a claim which is the property of the 
debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 1509(f). 
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court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.
53
 
However, under Chapter 15, the foreign proceeding must be classified 
specifically as a “foreign main” or “foreign nonmain” proceeding in order 
to gain recognition.
54
  These concepts are adopted virtually word-for-word 
from the UNCITRAL Model Law.
55
  In addition, courts have held that the 




Chapter 15 defines “foreign main proceeding” to mean “a foreign 
proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its 
main interests” and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” to mean “a foreign 
proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country 
where the debtor has an establishment.”57  While Chapter 15 contains a 
number of definitions solely applicable to that chapter, and is in fact the 
only chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to do so, many of the terms 
surrounding the “foreign main” and “foreign nonmain” designations are 
wholly undefined.  While “establishment” is defined as “any place of 
operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic 
activity,”58 neither “operations” nor “nontransitory economic activity” are 
defined in the Code, and no definition exists which clearly delineates what 
qualifies as a debtor’s “center of main interests” (COMI).59  Since 
recognition is the gateway through which virtually any relief may be 
obtained in the U.S. courts under Chapter 15, the lack of clarity surrounding 
these terms has driven controversy in the courts. 
Moreover, just as recognition of any type is paramount in establishing 
a right to relief in the U.S. courts, determining recognition of a foreign 
proceeding as main or nonmain is key in assessing what types of relief a 
foreign entity may seek within the system.  The relief available to a foreign 
main representative under Chapter 15 includes the automatic stay of all of a 
                                                        
53 11 U.S.C. § 101(23).  Note that while Chapter 15 contains definitions solely applicable 
to that Chapter, the definitions contained in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code also apply 
per 11 U.S.C. § 103(a); see U.S. v. J.A. Jones Const. Group, LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 n.2 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(23)–(24) for reference); see also Melnik, supra 
note 30, at 284 n.72 (detailing that eighty-six definitions contained in Section 101 apply to 
Chapter 15). 
54 11 U.S.C. § 1517. 
55 See UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 20, 28–31. 
56 In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 292 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008) (“In accordance with In re Bear 
Stearns High–Grade Structured Credit, comity is not an element of recognition; it is rather, a 
consideration once recognition is granted”). 
57 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)–(5) (2006). 
58 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2). 
59 See Melnik, supra note 30, at 275; Lavie v. Ran, 384 B.R. 469 (S.D. Tex. 2008).  11 
U.S.C. § 1516 does establish that “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor’s 
registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the 
center of the debtor’s main interests,” but this has proven to be far from clear for courts 
confronting COMI analysis. 
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debtor’s property within U.S. jurisdictional boundaries60 and allowance to 
voluntarily file a Chapter 11 case, while a foreign nonmain representative is 
limited to filing only an involuntary Chapter 11 case.
61
  The practical effect 
of this distinction stems from the fact that because a proceeding classified 
as “foreign nonmain” will be barred from any voluntary Chapter 11 




Section 1516(c) aims to shed some light in defining the debtor’s 
“center of main interests.”  It details that “[i]n the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the case 
of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main 
interests.”63  Courts have held that this is a rebuttable presumption.64 
 
2. COMI Analysis in U.S. Courts 
A few early U.S. court cases confronting the Section 1516(c) 
presumption applied a straightforward and uninquiring analysis of the 
debtor’s COMI.  Consider In re Artimm.65  Though ultimately decided 
under the old Section 304 standards due to the timing of filing, the court 
there explored the standards of the new Chapter 15 procedure.
66 
 It 
concluded that because the Italian debtor corporation Artimm had a 
registered office in Rome, it would assume that the company’s center of 
main interests was in Rome.
67
  Another early Chapter 15 case, In re Tri-
Continental Exchange Ltd., also applied a simplified COMI analysis.
68
  The 
court stated that the debtor’s main office or place of incorporation could be 
accepted as a proxy for COMI generally, but highlighted that different 
                                                        
60 See In re Artimm, S.r.L., 335 B.R. 149, 159 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2005) (“The 
consequences of an order recognizing a foreign main proceeding are substantial.  Most 
dramatically, the U.S. automatic stay, in all its details, applies immediately with respect to 
the debtor and property of the debtor that is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.  See § 1520(a)(1).  This is a major change from the law under § 304, which 
required a court order for the imposition of a stay on domestic creditor collection action.”). 
61 Elkin, supra note 50, at 960; see also Gropper, supra note 31, at 704–07, 724–25 
(detailing the list of forms of relief available to main and nonmain proceeding parties). 
62 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (a voluntary bankruptcy petition is filed by the debtor, while 
an involuntary petition is filed by creditors that meet certain requirements). 
63 See generally In re Artimm, 335 B.R. at 159; In re Tri-Continental Exchange, Ltd., 349 
B.R. 627, 635 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (examining main offices as potential COMI 
locations). 
64 See In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 371 B.R. 10 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Pursuant to the introductory clause to [Section] 1516(c), however, that 
presumption may be rebutted.”). 
65 335 B.R. at 149–66. 
66 Id. at 159. 
67 Id. 
68 In re Tri-Continental Exch., Ltd., 349 B.R. at 631. 
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Location of Foreign Proceeding COMI Analysis 
Country of debtor’s registered office 
(or place of incorporation) 
Country is presumed as the proxy for 
COMI absent evidence that the 
debtor’s COMI is elsewhere, in which 
case the foreign representative bears 
the burden of proof on COMI 
Country other than the country of 
debtor’s registered office (or place of 
incorporation) 
Foreign representative bears the 
burden of proof on COMI 
 
In that case, the debtors were a number of insurance companies 
operating under the laws of the Caribbean islands making up St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines (SVG).  The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
appointed liquidators during the companies’ winding-up proceedings.70  A 
creditor argued that the case should not be deemed a foreign main 
proceeding since most of the alleged defrauded creditors were located in the 
United States.
71
  However, the court held that because the debtors 
“conducted regular business operations at their registered offices” in SVG, 
the nation would qualify as the companies’ COMI “even though the 
enterprise perpetrated an insurance scam primarily in the United States and 
Canada.”72 
During the same month of the In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd. 
decision, the court of the Southern District of New York issued the first of 
three decisions directly addressing the standard for rebutting the 
presumption of COMI under Section 1516(c). 
First, In re SPhinX involved a debtor that had incorporated and 
registered in the Cayman Islands, kept some business records in the 
country, and received some mail there.
73
  In accordance with local 
regulations, the company was not authorized to and did not conduct any 
business in the Cayman Islands, had no employees there, and maintained no 
assets in the country.
74
  The court ruled that these factors, along with the 
facts that the debtor had $500 million in assets in the United States and all 
of the debtor’s corporate processes were handled in the United States, were 
enough to rebut the presumption of the COMI being located in the 
                                                        
69 Id. at 635. 
70 Id. at 629–30. 
71 Id. at 633. 
72 Id. at 629. 
73 351 B.R. at 119. 
74 Id. at 107–08. 
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  The court instead recognized the proceeding as a “foreign 
nonmain” proceeding where there was no objection to the recognition and 
“no negative consequences would appear to result from recognizing the 
Cayman Islands proceedings as nonmain proceedings.”76  Writing more 
generally, the SPhinX court noted that while the Bankruptcy Code did not 
state the type of evidence required to rebut the COMI presumption, various 
factors could be relevant to the COMI determination, including: 
[T]he location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who 
actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the 
headquarters of a holding company); the location of the debtor’s 
primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors 
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; 
and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.
77
 
Under this reasoning, the debtors’ proceeding in In re Tri-Continental 
Exchange Ltd. would likely also fail to be recognized as a foreign main 
proceeding since the “majority of the creditors who would be affected by 




Two other cases in the Southern District of New York, In re Bear 
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund. Ltd. (Bear 
Stearns)
79
 and In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) (Basis Yield),
80
 also 
examined the recognition status of entities incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands and also concluded that the COMI was not the Caymans and thus 
the proceedings could not be recognized as foreign main proceedings.  
However, unlike the court in In re SPhinX, both the Bear Stearns and Basis 
Yield courts refused to recognize the foreign proceeding as a foreign 
nonmain proceeding. 
The debtor party in Bear Stearns, two investment funds registered as 
limited liability companies in the Cayman Islands but administered and 
managed by a U.S. company and with assets in the United States, looked 
substantially similar to the debtor in SPhinX.
81
  The Bear Stearns court, 
however, squarely rejected the dicta of the SPhinX decision which indicated 
that the lack of an objection by a party in interest was enough to green-light 
the approval of a foreign main or nonmain proceeding.
82
  The court asserted 
                                                        
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 122. 
77 Id. at 117. 
78 See also In re SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding the 2006 SPhinX 
decision on appeal). 
79 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
80 381 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
81 In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 124. 
82 Id. at 126; see also Daniel M. Glosband et al., SPhinX Chapter 15 Opinion Misses the 
Mark, 26-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (2007), available at www.abiworld.org. 
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that “recognition under section 1517 is not to be rubber stamped by the 
courts.  This Court must make an independent determination as to whether 
the foreign proceeding meets the definitional requirements of sections 1502 
and 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code.”83  The court first reached its decision 
that the company was not entitled to foreign main proceeding recognition.  
It looked to both the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency
84
 and a recent landmark COMI decision from the 
European Court of Justice, known as the Eurofood case
85
 to determine that 
the COMI presumption could be easily rebutted in the case of a “letterbox” 
company. 
Further, the court found that the proceeding could not be recognized as 
a foreign nonmain proceeding because there was no “establishment” as 
required under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1517 and defined under § 1502.
86
  According 
to the court, in order to meet the requirements of § 1517, “there must be an 
‘establishment’ in the Cayman Islands for the conduct of nontransitory 
economic activity, i.e., a local place of business.”87  In this case, the funds 
in question were exempted entities that were prohibited from and did not 
engage in business in the Caymans “except in furtherance of their business 
otherwise carried on outside of the Cayman Islands”88 as required by 
Cayman Islands law,
89
 and the entities could not meet the establishment 
requirement of § 1517.  Interestingly, the decision was upheld on appeal by 
the same judge who also upheld the SPhinX decision a little more than a 
year before.
90
  In addressing the reasoning within these seemingly 
                                                        
83 In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 126.  Note that the Judge in this case, J. Burton R. 
Lifland, participated in the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law and continued to 
participate in UNCITRAL Insolvency matters after the development of the law.  
Multinational Judicial Colloquium, UNCITRAL-INSOL International, Mar. 22–23, 1995, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/FirstJC.pdf; Multinational Judicial 
Colloquium, UNCITRAL-INSOL International, Oct. 13–14, 1999, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/ThirdJC.pdf. 
84  In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 129; G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 
30, 1998); UNCITRAL, supra note 5; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 169 n. 101. 
85 See Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, at ¶ 35, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm.  As noted by the European Court of Justice, 
the COMI presumption may be overcome “particular[ly] in the case of a ‘letterbox’ company 
not carrying out any business in the territory of the Member State in which its registered 
office is situated.”  See also In re SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (citing to Eurofood and the 
“letterbox” exception).  See generally UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶ 122 (explaining that the 
presumption does “not prevent, in accordance with applicable procedural law, calling for or 
assessing other evidence if the conclusion suggested by the presumption is called into 
question by the court or an interested party”). 
86 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2), (5) (2006). 
87 In In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 131. 
88 Id. 
89 Companies Law (2004 Revision) of the Cayman Islands § 193. 
90 See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 389 
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inconsistent opinions, Judge Sweet stated that “any language in [the SPhinX 
opinion on appeal] bearing on the bankruptcy court’s nonmain 
determination must be viewed as dicta” and “it must also be noted that there 
is no presumption applicable to the recognition determination with respect 
to a nonmain proceeding,” suggesting a broader basis of flexibility in 
making a nonmain determination.
91
 
Less than six months after the initial ruling in Bear Stearns, the Basis 
Yield court arrived at a similar conclusion to the Bear Stearns court.
92
  In 
that case, joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) of a foreign debtor fund 
registered in the Cayman Islands filed a petition for recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding in the Caymans.
93
  There were no objections to the 
recognition by any party in interest, and the JPLs argued they were entitled 
to the presumption of the COMI in the Cayman Islands under Section 
1516.
94
  The court rejected this argument, however, holding that while the 
COMI presumption existed to ensure speed, convenience, and cost-savings 
for the parties, it did not limit the ability of the court to examine the 
presumed COMI more closely if it deems “the issues to be sufficiently 
material to warrant further inquiry” and possibly rebut the presumption.95  
Like in Bear Stearns, the Basis Yield court determined that the proceeding 
could not properly be recognized either as a foreign main or nonmain 
proceeding under Chapter 15. 
3. COMI Analysis in Foreign Courts: The Eurofood Decision 
While the development of COMI analysis in the context of insolvency 
law is still relatively young both in the United States and abroad, it is not all 
that surprising that U.S. courts have found themselves struggling with the 
same difficulties facing other UNCITRAL Model Law nations in 
determining which COMI analysis best meets the needs and interests of 
creditors, debtors, and the standard of comity among States.  Nevertheless, 
foreign models interpreting COMI have been and will likely continue to be 
useful and influential sources for U.S. judges examining the issue. 
First, it is important to note that examination of certain foreign models 
and caselaw in the COMI context is not simply a useful tool based on the 
similarities of the Model Law implementation, but in fact urged by the 
Model Law and Chapter 15 itself,
96
 and a number of decisions have looked 
                                                                                                                                
B.R. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
91 Id. at 334. 
92 See In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.  2008). 
93 Id. 
94 In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund, 381 B.R. at 43; see 11 U.S.C. § 1516 (stating that “in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence 
in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main interests”). 
95 Id. at 52. 
96 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (“In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international 
origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the 
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to the UNCITRAL Guide to the Model Law and foreign case decisions 
when assessing U.S. petitions.
97
 
One of the most substantive and influential non-U.S. decisions 
examining COMI was Eurofood, ultimately adjudicated by the European 
Court of Justice (EJC) in 2006.
98
  In that case, the company at issue, 
Eurofood, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Parmalat, a company 
incorporated in Italy and operating through subsidiary companies in more 
than two dozen countries.
99
  Eurofood’s registered office was in Dublin, 
Ireland, and its principal objective was providing financing for other 
subsidiaries of Parmalat.
100
  Following the collapse of the Parmalat Group 
into a financial crisis in late 2003, both Ireland and Italy issued rulings that 
held their own States as Eurofood’s COMI and accordingly determined 
their own States were the nation of the main insolvency proceeding.
101
  The 
jurisdictional dispute was referred to the EJC, which ruled in favor of the 
Irish courts.  According to its ruling, when a debtor subsidiary entity goes 
beyond merely keeping a “letterbox” or post-office address in a nation and 
instead actually carries out its business where its registered office is located, 
the fact that the parent company can control the subsidiary from another 
state is not enough to rebut the presumption of COMI.
102
  Instead, rebuttal 
can only take place “if factors which are both objective and ascertainable by 
third parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists which 
is different from that which location at that registered office is deemed to 
reflect.”103  Moreover, this focus on third parties—namely, creditors—is 
important to “ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the 
determination of the court with jurisdiction to open main insolvency 
proceedings.”104 
                                                                                                                                
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”). 
97 See, e.g., In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008); SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10; 
Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 129. 
98 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm; see also Samuel J. Bufford, Center of Main 
Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood 
Decision of the European Court of Justice, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 351 (2007) (discussion 
and in-depth analysis of the Eurofood case). 
99 Id. 
100 Bufford, supra note 98, at 364–65.  Note that the office was located at the Custom 
House Dock in Dublin, a center dedicated to businesses that operate in internationally traded 
financial services to non-residents of Ireland and provide a number of tax haven benefits to 
those businesses.  Samuel J. Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue in the European 
Union: The Parmalat and Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429, 440 (2006). 
101 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at I-3868. 
104 Id. 
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4. Analysis 
The Eurofood emphasis on predictability and special attention to 
creditor interests is something that should be kept top-of-mind by U.S. 
courts examining COMI analysis issues.  While the COMI test on its face 
seems to focus solely on the debtor, the SPhinX court’s list of both debtor 
and creditor-based factors when determining COMI is likely more just,
105
 
especially when confronted with debtor entities aiming to avoid U.S. tax 
and insolvency law by incorporating and registering in “tax-haven” 
countries.  While the goals of Chapter 15 dictate that the aims are to 
“protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested entities, 
including the debtor” and to ensure the “protection and maximization of the 
value of the debtor’s assets,”106 shifting the balance of factors in favor of 
creditors may meet another prime goal of Chapter 15: to create “greater 
legal certainty for trade and investment.”107  Moreover, giving more weight 
to creditor predictability could serve to discourage forum shopping by 
would-be debtors and fall squarely in line with the interests indicated in 
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.
108
 
An emphasis on creditor-based factors in the COMI analysis, however, 
should not be limited to where the majority of affected creditors are located, 
however, but also look to the potential outcome for both creditors and 
debtors in the longer-term insolvency proceeding.  For example, one 
significant criticism of the Eurofood decision was that by focusing solely on 
the COMI of the subsidiary entity Eurofood rather than the parent company 
Parmalat, the EJC set in motion a precedent which would ultimately 
complicate the insolvency proceedings of corporate groups and multi-
national holding companies since each subsidiary could presumably have a 
different COMI than its parent.
109
  In the long-term, these complications 
could incur significant damage to all interested creditors by creating delay 
and expense in proceedings across nations.  Taken together, the long-term 
best interests of the creditors—and debtors for that matter—might have best 
been served with a single case proceeding of all the Parmalat subsidiaries in 
one country. 
                                                        
105 “[T]he location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who actually 
manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the headquarters of a holding company); the 
location of the debtor’s primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors 
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or the jurisdiction 
whose law would apply to most disputes.” SPhinX, 351 B.R. at 117. 
106 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(3)–(4) (2006). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2). 
108 See, e.g., the so-called “best interest of creditors” tests indicated in Chapter 11(11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)), Chapter 13 (11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4)), and Chapter 9 (11 U.S.C. § 
943(b)(7)). 
109 Bufford, supra note 98, at 381.  See generally Aaron M. Kaufman, The European 
Union Goes Comi-tose: Hazards of Harmonizing Corporate Insolvency Laws in the Global 
Economy, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 625 (2007). 
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Beyond the COMI analysis itself, the question still remains if cases 
like Bear Stearns and Basis Yield, which rejected both foreign main and 
foreign nonmain recognition, truly serve the interests and goals of Chapter 
15 and the aims of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  As noted by one 
commentator, recognition is “effectively . . . an ‘entry visa’ jurisdictional 
prerequisite to seeking relief from any court within the United States.”110  If 
a proceeding is not properly recognized as foreign main or foreign nonmain, 
does that then mean there is no legal recourse for a petitioner’s relief within 
the U.S. courts?  The court in In re Bear Stearns answered this question in 
the negative, asserting that Section 303(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code 
“specifically provides that an involuntary case may be commenced under 
chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by a foreign representative of the 
estate in a foreign proceeding so that a foreign representative is not left 
remediless upon nonrecognition.”111  An earlier decision in the neighboring 
Eastern District of New York, however, highlighted that “in the absence of 
recognition under chapter 15” the federal court “has no authority to 
consider [a] request for a stay” against a foreign debtor.112  Chapter 15 itself 
seems to provide that in some cases a petitioner might indeed be left 
without recourse for relief.  While 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(f) indicates that 
relief can be sought under other measures in the U.S. courts (including § 
303), that right to relief is subject to other provisions of the section, 
including § 1509(d) which states that “if the court denies recognition under 
this chapter, the court may issue any appropriate order necessary to prevent 
the foreign representative from obtaining comity or cooperation from courts 
in the United States.”113  Thus, in some cases, an unrecognized petitioner 
might be effectively “banned” from seeking cooperation or relief through 
Section 303 or otherwise.  While there may be extreme cases in which 
action under Section 1509(d) is necessary, courts should weigh these 
actions against the interests of debtors and creditors who may well be 
entitled to relief in some measure within the U.S. court system.
114
 
B. The Public Policy Exception 
1. The Public Policy Exception and the Principle of Comity 
Under the former international insolvency provision of 11 U.S.C. § 
                                                        
110 See Melnik, supra note 30, at 273–74 (noting there are limited exceptions within § 
1509 but that these “exceptions” are not without their own complications). 
111  Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 132.  Section 303(b)(4) reads that “An involuntary case 
against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under 
chapter 7 or 11 of this title . . . by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign 
proceeding concerning such person.”  11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4). 
112 United States v. J.A. Jones Constr. Grp., LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
113 11 U.S.C. § 1509(d) & (f) (2006). 
114 As of November 2010, only five published cases had addressed § 1509(d) at all, and 
none of them addressed it in depth. 
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304, bankruptcy courts were given broad discretion to recognize cases 
ancillary to foreign insolvency proceedings consistent with, among other 
things, the just treatment of creditors and the principles of comity.
115
  In 
general and within the bankruptcy context, comity can be viewed as 
appropriate where foreign “proceedings do not violate the laws or public 
policy of the United States, and if the foreign court abides by fundamental 
standards of procedural fairness.”116  Thus, under the standard of Section 
304, the court’s discretion to accord relief included the discretion to reject 
the right relief based on the principle of comity. 
In adopting the UNCITRAL’s more “cooperative” international 
standards including the mandatory recognition of foreign main proceedings, 
Chapter 15 also enacted Article 6 of the Model Law verbatim.  Section 
1506 states: “[n]othing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to 
take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the United States.”117  In its adoption, 
Congress noted that the provision of Article 6 “has been narrowly 
interpreted on a consistent basis in courts around the world” and such a 
narrow interpretation would also be expected in U.S. courts.
118
  Moreover, 
Congress dictated that “the word ‘manifestly’ in international usage restricts 
the public policy exception to the most fundamental policies of the United 
States.”119  This interpretation coincides with the intent of the drafters of the 
Model Law,
120
 and has been noted by some U.S. courts.
121
 
2. Applying the Public Policy Exception in U.S. Courts 
In the few cases to date that have claimed public policy violations and 
aimed to invoke Section 1506, courts seemed to follow Congressional intent 
and almost entirely rejected the claims, indeed treating the provision, as it 
was described by one court, as a “safety valve” to the requirements of 
Chapter 15 recognition.
122
  Since few decisions to date have found that the 
fundamental policies of the United States were at risk and invoked the 
public policy exception,
123
 case law is still far from comprehensive as to 
                                                        
115 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (repealed 2005). 
116 Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir.1999). 
117 11 U.S.C. § 1506. 
118 H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172. 
119 Id. 
120 UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 88–89 (1997) (stating that “article 6 is only intended to 
be invoked under exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance 
for the enacting State”). 
121 See, e.g., In re Tri-Cont’l Exch., Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) 
(“Congress has indicated, with its use of the phrase ‘manifestly contrary,’ that this exception 
is to be narrowly construed, which view is consistent with the explication in the 
[UNCITRAL Model Law] Guide.”). 
122 Basis Yield, 381 B.R. at 45 n. 27. 
123 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 
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what circumstances can constitute a risk great enough to overcome 
considerations of comity and international cooperation in insolvency 
proceedings.  Nevertheless, key decisions are beginning to form a cohesive 
standard indicating the use of the doctrine in only very narrow 
circumstances. 
Most recently, the district court of the Eastern District of Virginia 
endeavored to reconcile what it viewed as the most in-depth published 
decisions examining § 1506 and to develop principles for evaluating claims 
pursuant to it in In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation (Qimonda).
124
  
The court began by noting that the key decisions in this area agreed that 
“the fact that application of foreign law leads to a different result than 
application of U.S. law is, without more, insufficient to support § 1506 
protection,” though such a conflict of laws is a necessary prerequisite to any 
viable § 1506 claim.
125
  In addition to this principle, the court held that at 
least two other principles should guide courts analyzing whether an action 
within a Chapter 15 proceeding is “manifestly contrary to the public policy 
of the United States.”126  First, the court stated that a foreign proceeding 
should not be given deference where that court’s procedural fairness was in 
question or could not be resolved by additional legal protections.
127
  In 
addition, the court stated that court action in Chapter 15 cases should be 
avoided where it might frustrate a U.S. court’s ability to administer the 
Chapter 15 proceeding and/or would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional 
or statutory right, particularly if a party continues to enjoy the benefits of 
the Chapter 15 proceeding.
128
  Notably, the Qimonda court cited these 
considerations as just some of the guiding principles that courts could use in 
making a § 1506 determination.
129
 
Aligning with this reasoning, courts have held that none of the 
following are enough to properly invoke the public policy exception: the 
potential for U.S. creditors to get less money as a result of a foreign 
proceeding,
130
 the inability to conduct a jury trial in the foreign 
proceeding,
131
 or the enforcement of a non-debtor, third party release and 
injunction valid under foreign law but which might not be valid under U.S. 
                                                                                                                                
357 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
124 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010) (the Qimonda court focused its attention on four 
decisions, In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010), In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008), In re Ephedra Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and Gold & Honey, Ltd.,  410 B.R. 357). 
125 In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. at 568. 
126 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006). 
127 In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. at 570. 
128 Id. at 570. 
129 Id. 
130 Ernst & Young, Inc. 383 BR 773. 
131 Ephedra Prods., 349 B.R. at 336–37. 
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One significant case which held § 1506 to apply in an action of a 
Chapter 15 proceeding was In re Gold & Honey, Ltd.
133
  There, the debtors 
were Gold & Honey, Ltd. (G&H Ltd.),  a corporation formed and organized 
in Israel, and Gold & Honey LP (G&H LP), a United States’ limited 
partnership whose general partnership included a large equity stake owned 
by G&H Ltd.
134
  In July 2008, an Israeli banking corporation and 
prepetition lender to G&H LP forced the seizure of both of G&H entities’ 
assets and began an Israeli receivership proceeding.
135
  Shortly thereafter, 
the debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition, invoking the automatic stay of 11 
U.S.C. § 362.  Despite the bankruptcy court’s instruction to discontinue its 
proceedings in light of the automatic stay, the Israeli court continued to 
prosecute its receivership proceeding.
136
  In January 2009, the lender filed 
motions to lift the automatic stay and filed for petition of recognition of the 
Israeli proceeding under Chapter 15.
137
 
The court refused to recognize the Israeli proceeding as either foreign 
main or foreign nonmain because, inter alia, the appointment of the Israeli 
receivers was a violation of the automatic stay and recognition of the 
foreign proceeding would “have an adverse effect on public policy” under 
Section 1506.
138
  The court asserted that the lenders proceeded with the 
receivership proceeding in Israel “in spite of and in the face of [the U.S.] 
Court’s Stay Order” and that recognizing the Chapter 15 petition and the 
receivers “appointed as the result of a knowing a willful violation of the 
stay” order would “fly in the face of the Bankruptcy Code.”139  Moreover, 
recognizing the violation as valid by allowing the Israeli receivers to 
proceed in collection of the debtor’s assets would prevent U.S. bankruptcy 
courts from carrying out important fundamental policies and purposes of 
the automatic stay.
140
  Specifically, “preventing one creditor from obtaining 
an advantage over other creditors, and providing for the efficient and 
orderly distribution of a debtor’s assets to all creditors in accordance with 
their relative priorities.”141 
                                                        
132 In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Inves., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
133  Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. 357 (this case was one examined by the Qimonda court in 
developing its principles); see also Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (recently holding violation of Section 
1506 where a German Mail Interception Order would “directly contravene U.S. laws and 
public policies” including electronic privacy rights, the powers of estate representatives, and 
the rights of parties affected by court orders to notice). 
134 Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 362. 
135 Id. at 362–63. 
136 Id. at 363. 
137 Id. at 365. 
138 Id. at 368. 
139 Id. 
140 Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 372. 
141 Id. 




While it appears from the decisions addressing § 1506 thus far that 
courts have very narrowly construed the provision, there is potential for the 
public policy exception to be used in some cases that would go against the § 
1501 goals of international cooperation, comity, and fair and efficient 
administration of cross-border insolvencies.  In order to maintain the 
narrowness of the use of the public policy exception while still ensuring the 
spirit of international cooperation and fairness to debtors and creditors, 
courts can keep a few things in mind.  First, the principles detailed in the 
recent Qimonda decision provide a good starting point for evaluating 
potential § 1506 claims, but courts should also take care to examine any 
U.S. constitutional or statutory rights within the context of the Bankruptcy 
Code and against the broader, global understanding of fair and just 
treatment in insolvency proceedings.  This narrow examination has, in the 
past, led courts to discard a challenge of potential removal of a jury right, 
since the right to a jury in the bankruptcy context is quite rare and many 
non-jury foreign proceedings can still result in a “fair and impartial 
proceeding.”142 
Unlike the COMI issue where creditor rights should arguably play a 
larger role in a COMI analysis and recognition determination, creditor and 
debtor rights are and should continue to be secondary or even tertiary 
considerations in the public policy exception.
143
  If recognition could 
significantly harm the fundamental interests of the United States, § 1506 
will be properly invoked and recognition denied, even if recognition could 
serve to significantly benefit U.S. creditor interests.  One commentator has 
noted that alternative measures might be taken by the court to ensure 
fairness and opportunity to potentially gain relief without invoking the 
public policy exception, namely, challenging the debtor’s COMI and citing 
§ 1521(b) to ensure that “the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors 
in the United States are sufficiently protected.”144  While these measures 
seem useful, they can only be properly invoked if due care is given to U.S. 
creditor interests, as suggested above, particularly with regard to the COMI 
analysis.  Further, courts facing significant violations of comity and 
fundamental policies breached upon the United States by other nations, as 
appeared to be the case in In re Gold & Honey, should not shy away from 
utilizing the § 1506 public policy exception, lest they encourage greater 
forum shopping and continued blatant violations of the comity principle by 
foreign nations. 
 
                                                        
142 Ephedra Prods., 349 B.R. at 336–37. 
143 See Ernst & Young, 383 BR 773. 
144 Mund, supra note 21, at 354; 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2006). 
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III.  CONCLUSIONS 
As discussed in this Comment, case law development pursuant to 
Chapter 15 matters should continue the tradition, already at work in some 
U.S. courts, to examine foreign cases and models as well as the 
UNCITRAL Guide to the Model Law for instructive guidance in decision-
making, especially surrounding the COMI analysis.  In addition, a shifting 
of the balance of factors in the COMI analysis towards broad creditor 
interests could likely better meet the Chapter 15 goal of ensuring “greater 
legal certainty for trade and investment”145 while protecting U.S. creditor 
rights and interests.  Finally, courts will likely continue to narrowly 
construe the public policy exception of § 1506, aligning with the principle 
of comity and meeting the UNCITRAL objective of greater international 
cooperation in insolvency proceedings. 
With regard to the COMI analysis, the public policy exception, and 
other emerging and potentially developing legal issues surrounding Chapter 
15 matters, there is a broader step U.S. courts can take to meet all of the 
goals of § 1501 and the objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law overall 
while providing caselaw guidance for other nations examining insolvency 
issues: publishing opinions.  Though about 300 cases have been 
commenced under Chapter 15 since its enactment, and likely more petitions 
rejected,
146
 only about forty-five opinions have been published examining 
the petitions, proceedings, or related adversary proceedings.
147
  A practice 
of publishing opinions surrounding Chapter 15 issues more frequently will 
not only provide greater guidance for U.S. courts investigating these issues 
but also continue the longstanding tradition of U.S. leadership and 
innovation in the field of international insolvency law by providing 
concrete models for foreign courts to examine.
148
 
                                                        
145 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2). 
146 See sources cited, supra note 6. 
147 Author Selina A. Melnik documented that in mid-February 2009, only 16 published 
opinions existed.  Melnik, supra note 30, at 267–68.  A search of Westlaw on November 18, 
2010, returned sixteen more decisions, some concerning the same case or issue (In re Condor 
Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Loy, 
432 B.R. 551 (E.D. Va. 2010); In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 
2010); Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277 (S.D. Tex 2009); In re Bozel S.A., 434 B.R. 86 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re British Am. Ins. Co. Ltd., 425 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In re 
Chiang, 437 B.R. 397 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2010); In re JSC BTA Bank, 434 B.R. 334 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Japan Airlines Corp., 425 B.R. 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re 
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re RHTC 
Liquidating Co., 424 B.R. 714 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010); In re Atlas Shipping, A/S 404 B.R. 
726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2009); In re Spansion, Inc., 418 B.R. 84 (Bankr. Del. 2009); In re Steadman 410 B.R. 397, 
(Bankr. N.J. 2009)). 
148 Note that in addition to court opinions, further action by Congress may be relevant 
and useful in legal developments in this area.  While for many years after its adoption no 
readily apparent Congressional action had addressed Chapter 15, the recent Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)) 





                                                                                                                                
required that a study and report to Congress be completed examining the mechanisms and 
extent of “international coordination relating to bankruptcy process for financial companies.”  
Though narrow in scope, this report could also help contribute to the development of 
Chapter 15 jurisprudence or lead to further Congressional examination of the Chapter more 
broadly. 
